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use#LAAaMERICA AND THE BSE SCARE:
NEAR MISSES, FUTURE LESSONS
by Kannon K. Shanmugam
{
The public buys its opinions as it buys its meat, or takes in its milk, on the principle
that it is cheaper to do this than to keep a cow. So it is, but the milk is more likely
to be watered."
| Samuel Butler
On March 28, 1996, I paid the strangest visit of my life to a McDonald's. Ordinarily, it would be impossible
to walk into the McDonald's in downtown Oxford, England, at dinnertime without encountering hundreds
of tourists, screaming children, and local teenagers. On this day, however, where there would usually be
hundreds of people, there were only two. Only two, because there were no hamburgers. In fact, in a
throwback to the old Soviet Union, there were just two items on the menu: chicken and sh. The Burger
King up the street was no dierent. A day later, I walked past the normally buzzing Angus Steakhouse
outside Victoria Station in London, only to nd it closed. At the local supermarket, row upon row of freezer
lay empty. On my ight back to the United States, British Airways oered chicken in place of the usual
beef.
Britain had fallen prey to a food scare unprecedented in the last decade, if not generation. In the weeks
that followed, the crisis surrounding {mad cow" disease would have truly worldwide implications, aecting
the regulatory policies of virtually every industrialized nation. Today, the potential consequences of the
disease, although perhaps not as great as originally feared, still demand attention at the highest level of
government. In this paper, my goals are twofold: to place the development of the disease in its historical
1context, and to examine the options faced by government regulators in attempting to stem its spread. The
paper comprises four parts. In Part I, I briey trace the historical background to the {mad cow" scare, from
its origin in England to the present day. In Part II, I examine the American response to the disease, situating
steps taken by the United States government in the broader context of simultaneous developments occurring
around the world. In Part III, I outline proposals made this month by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to impose a complete ban on certain types of animal feed implicated in the spread of {mad cow"
disease. Finally, in Part IV, I present possible criticisms of the latest FDA proposals, arguing that they are
too narrow to deal with the threat of human infection from unforeseen species and too dicult to enforce. In
addition, I present alternative proposals to address each of these concerns. I begin, though, not with policy
prescriptions, but with the discovery of an obscure disease some 200 years ago.
I. History of TSEs
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) are slowly progressive, degenerative diseases of the cen-
tral nervous system. They have been found in a wide variety of animal species and are invariably fatal.
Although symptoms of the disease dier somewhat from species to species, they include abnormalities of
behavior, posture, and gait, and ultimate loss of neurological function.1 The earliest discovered form of TSE
was scrapie, a disease aecting sheep and goats that is known to have existed in Europe for more than 200
years2 and in North America for at least fty.3 The human analogue to scrapie, Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
(CJD), seems to date from the 1920s, when a disease known as {subacute spongiform encephalopathy" was
rst cited in medical literature.4 Cases of CJD have been discovered around the world, with an annual inci-
1 See Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed, 62 Fed.
Reg. 552, 556{58 (1997) (to be codied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 589) (proposed Jan. 3, 1997) [hereinafter FDA Report].
2 See id. at 556.
3 See id.
4 See Stephen F. Dealler & Richard W. Lacey, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies, in 4 Encyclopedia of
Microbiology 299 (Joshua Lederberg ed., 1992).
2dence of approximately one case per million of the population.5 Until recently, the disease almost exclusively
struck the old,6 with ninety percent of victims dying within one year of the disease's onset.7
The {mad cow" saga began with the discovery of a new form of TSE in cattle, bovine spongiform en-
cephalopathy (BSE). In 1985, dairy farmers in Britain began noticing symptoms in their cows similar to
those of other TSEs, prompting an investigation by scientists from the British Ministry of Agriculture.8 In
November 1986, the British Central Veterinary Laboratory identied BSE as a new disease.9 The British
government initially did nothing,10 though government scientists started conducting epidemiological studies
the following April.11 Almost eighteen months later, in April 1988, the government nally took formal ac-
tion, establishing a working party, headed by Oxford Zoology Professor Sir Richard Southwood, to assess the
signicance of the burgeoning epidemic.12 Although the Southwood group's initial ndings were never made
public, the group appears to have been the rst to trace the cause of BSE to a cheap cattle feed created
from the carcasses of sheep stricken with scrapie.13 Consequently, the group recommended in June that
infected animals and their milk be destroyed, BSE be added to the list of compulsorily notiable diseases,
and further research be conducted.14 The government eventually implemented these recommendations, rst
banning the use of animal feed made from cattle and sheep remains in July, then ordering the destruction of
all infected cattle in August, and nally making BSE a notiable disease in November.15 In its nal report in
February 1989, the Southwood group concluded that it was {most unlikely that BSE will have implications
for human health,"16 predicting that the disease would strike 17,000 to 20,000 cattle before beginning to die
5 See FDA Report, supra note 1, at 557.
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 See Sean Poulter, The Scare That Has Simmered for Years, The Daily Mail, Mar. 21, 1996, at 6.
9 See id.
10 See Emily Wilson, Ten-Year Battle Against Scourge, The Daily Mirror, Mar. 21, 1996, at 4.
11 See Andrew Pierce, Ten Years Deciding if Beef Is Safe, The Times, Mar. 21, 1996.
12 See Poulter, supra note 8, at 6.
13 See id.
14 See Pierce, supra note 11.
15 See id.
16 Id.
3out in 1993.17 Despite the Southwood group's assessment that a link between BSE and TSEs in humans
was remote, the government banned the use of cattle oal in human food in November 1989,18 although it
later emerged that Britain continued to export tons of potentially contaminated cattle meal to France until
1991.19 Meanwhile, at least eighteen nations imposed restrictions on cattle imports from Britain, including
all eleven other members of the European Community.20
Fears of a potential link between BSE and CJD began to become prevalent in 1990. On January 8, the
British Ministry of Health announced a research program to investigate an apparent increase in the number
of deaths in Britain from CJD.21 The announcement sparked immediate speculation about a link between
BSE and CJD, with a May Gallup poll showing that more than 40% of British households were cutting back
on beef consumption or eliminating it altogether as a result.22 To assuage these concerns, then-Agriculture
Minister John Gummer held an infamous press conference, later criticized by the opposition Labor Party,23
in which he fed a hamburger to his four-year-old daughter, Cordelia.24 At the same time, leading scientists
began to speculate about the risk of transspecies transmission of TSEs. As early as May 13, 1990, Professor
Richard Lacey, a one-time government adviser who resigned after his warnings about an earlier salmonella
outbreak were ignored, called for the slaughter of six million cows to prevent the transmission of TSEs to
humans.25 Fears were heightened by the conrmation of the rst-ever case of TSE in a domestic cat.26
Between 1990 and 1996, BSE temporarily faded from the headlines, with comparatively few developments
relating to the disease. In 1993, Peter Warhurst, a dairy farmer whose herd had been aected by BSE, died
17 See Poulter, supra note 8, at 6.
18 See Wilson, supra note 10, at 4.
19 See French Furor Over British Exports of Feed Linked to Mad Cows, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1996, at A11.
20 See Marianne McGowan, Disease Killing British Cattle, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1990, at C13. Interestingly, this seems
to have been the rst article about BSE to appear in a major American newspaper.
21 See Poulter, supra note 8, at 6.
22 See Beef o the Menu After Mad Cow Scare, The Sunday Times, May 20, 1990.
23 See 274 Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons) 376 (Mar. 20, 1996) (statement of Shadow Health Minister
Harriet Harman).
24 See Poulter, supra note 8, at 6.
25 See Richard Palmer & Ian Birrell, Leading Food Scientist Calls for Slaughter of Six Million Cows, The Sunday Times,
May 13, 1990.
26 See id.
4of CJD,27 the rst case of CJD in which the victim was known to have been exposed to BSE.28 Meanwhile,
by March 1993, the number of cattle struck by BSE had risen to 87,00029 | more than four times the
worst-case prediction of the Southwood group. A year later, Germany urged the European Community to
impose a complete ban on British beef after two cases of BSE were reported in cattle imported from Britain
to Germany.30 In July, the British government announced that traces of BSE had been found for the rst
time in tissues outside the nervous systems of cattle, giving rise to further fears that British beef was con-
taminated.31 Although BSE generally remained out of the headlines during this period, fears steadily grew
to such a level that, when The Sunday Times surveyed fty leading scientists in December 1995, forty-seven
refused to rule out the possibility of a link between BSE and CJD.32
Until 1996, politicians in the British government consistently denied any link between BSE and CJD.33
However, disturbing developments in research on the BSE-CJD connection eventually forced the government
to take action, as chronicled by a compelling article in The Sunday Times.34 By the end of 1995, researchers
at the National CJD Surveillance Unit had discovered six cases of an apparently new strain of CJD ({new
variant" CJD, or nv-CJD), which struck primarily children and young adults rather than the old.35 The new
strain diered from the old one in three regards. First, the new strain was characterized by ower-shaped
deposits of abnormal protein in the brain.36 Also, victims of the new strain suered from anxiety and depres-
sion, in addition to the usual symptoms of CJD victims.37 Finally, and most ominously, all of the victims
were beefeaters.38 In February 1996, the number of cases of nv-CJD grew to eight, compelling the researchers
27 See Wilson, supra note 10, at 4.
28 See Poulter, supra note 8, at 6.
29 See Wilson, supra note 10, at 4.
30 See Sean Ryan, Germans Urge Euro Ban on British Beef, The Sunday Times, Mar. 13, 1994.
31 See Sean Ryan & Rajeev Syal, Beef Sales Drop by $10 Million in New `Mad Cow' Scare, The Sunday Times, July 3,
1994.
32 See Steve Connor & Simon Reeve, Scientists Voice New Beef Doubts, The Sunday Times, Dec. 3, 1995.
33 See, e.g., Poulter, supra note 8, at 6.
34 See Steven Connor & Michael Prescott, BSE, The Sunday Times, Mar. 24, 1996.
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See id.
5to alert the government's most senior scientic advisers.39 The Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Com-
mittee duly called an urgent meeting for March 8.40 At that meeting, the researchers presented slides of
their ndings, as {[t]he committee watched in stunned silence."41 The committee reconvened on March 16
and concluded, after two days of discussion, that the most likely explanation for nv-CJD was exposure to
BSE.42 On March 18, the committee notied the responsible ministers, who immediately contacted Prime
Minister John Major.43 The next morning, Major convened an emergency meeting, where it was decided
that Health Minister Stephen Dorrell | regarded as an adept politician and even a potential future Prime
Minister44 | should break the news to the public.45 The full Cabinet granted its approval the morning of
March 20, clearing the way for an announcement in Parliament the same afternoon.46 Meanwhile, during
the four days it took the committee and the government to decide upon a course of action, two more cases
of nv-CJD were reported, bringing the total number to ten.47
At exactly 3:30 p.m. on March 20, Dorrell strode into the House of Commons and delivered the following
statement:
With permission, Madam Speaker, I should like to make a statement about the lat-
est advice that the government have received from the Spongiform Encephalopathy
Advisory Committee.... There remains no scientic proof that bovine spongiform
encephalopathy can be transmitted to man by beef, but the committee has con-
cluded that the most likely explanation at present is that [the nv-CJD] cases are
linked to exposure to BSE before the introduction of the specied bovine oal ban
in 1989.48
At rst glance, this statement seems innocuous enough: after all, Dorrell stressed that there was {no scientic
proof" of a link between BSE and nv-CJD, and that any exposure to BSE occurred before the 1989 oal
39 See id.
40See id.
41 Id.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 See Philip Webster & Arthur Leathley, Dorrell Raises the Starter's Flag in Race for Succession, The Times, Jan. 3,
1997.
45 See Connor & Prescott, supra note 34.
46 See id.
47 See id.
6ban. But rather than focusing on these points, speakers in the ensuing debate zeroed in on the suggestion
that a BSE-CJD link was the {most likely explanation" for the new nv-CJD cases. In her response, Shadow
Health Minister Harriet Harman of the Labor Party charged that the government was giving {yet more false
reassurance":49
If the facts are not fully disclosed, the public response will be fear, which will then
be stoked up by ignorance and innuendo.... I appreciate that the position is dicult
and the information uncertain, but it is clear that the Secretary of State [Dorrell]
has lost the condence of the British people.50
Later on the same day, Agriculture Minister Douglas Hogg | who had been disqualied from giving the
statement on the possible BSE-CJD link because he was seen as insuciently telegenic51 | announced the
immediate implementation of a ban on the use of mammalian tissue in animal feed.52
Reading through the transcript, one is struck by the relatively measured tone of the parliamentary debate.
It is thus all the more surprising that the British public reacted with a frenzy verging on outright panic. In
addition to the typically sensationalistic tabloids, even the mainstream press carried banner headlines the
next morning proclaiming the advent of an epidemic.53 The Guardian, one of Britain's ve {quality" dailies,
carried the subheadline, {Many millions in potential danger."54 At least two newspapers reported on an
appearance by Professor John Pattison, chair of the Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee, on
BBC's Newsnight program, in which he warned that he could not rule out the possibility of up to 500,000
cases of nv-CJD per year.55 Of the {quality" dailies, only The Daily Telegraph | generally considered the
49 274 Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons) 376 (Mar. 20, 1996) (statement of Shadow Health Minister Harriet
Harman).
51 See Connor & Prescott, supra note 34.
52 See 274 Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons) 387 (Mar. 20, 1996) (statement of Agriculture Minister
Douglas Hogg).
53 See, e.g., Kevin Maguire & David Bradshaw, EPIDEMIC, The Daily Mirror, Mar. 21, 1996, at 2.
54 Paul Brown et al., Beef Warning Sparks Panic, The Guardian, Mar. 21, 1996, at 1.
55 See, e.g., Caroline Davies et al., Beef Linked to Brain Disease, The Daily Telegraph, Mar. 21, 1996, at 1; Maguire
& Bradshaw, supra note 53, at 2.
7most sympathetic to the government | reported Dorrell's statement that there was {no scientic proof" of
a BSE-CJD link.56 However, it exaggerated the import of his statement, reporting that he had said that
{scientists had not discovered absolute proof of the link," rather than that no such proof yet existed.57
Arguably, it was this press-driven hysteria, as much as the British government statement, that triggered
immediate reaction around the world. On March 21, ve European countries imposed bans on British
beef imports, with Germany renewing its call for a pan-European ban.58 In addition, about one-third of
British schools announced they were taking beef o the menu.59 Over the following week, several countries
joined the ban,60 and all of Britain's major fast-food chains announced that they would no longer serve
British beef.61 As the public abandoned beef in droves, the government seemed undecided about what to
do next. Speaking on the BBC's agship radio news program, Today, the morning after the announcement,
Dorrell said that the government was considering the wholesale slaughter of Britain's cattle.62 However,
on March 25, Hogg said that the safeguards then in place were sucient.63 Perhaps in response to the
British government's indecision, the European Commission, acting on the recommendation of a European
veterinary committee, imposed a worldwide ban on all exports of British beef and beef byproducts, ranging
from medicine to candy.64 In early May, in an attempt to convince the European Commission to lift the
ban, the British government began slaughtering approximately 15,000 to 20,000 cattle per week.65 However,
in September, the government again reversed course, virtually halting the slaughter after new evidence from
Oxford scientists suggested that the BSE outbreak would run its course by 2001.66 In October, British
56 See Davies et al., supra note 56, at 1.
57 Id. (emphasis added).
58 See John Darnton, British Beef Banned in France and Belgium, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1996, at A8.
59 See id.
60 See John Darnton, British Beef Sales Plunge as Germany and Italy Join Import Ban, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1996,
| 1, at 3.
61 See John Darnton, London Adamant as European Nations Ban British Beef, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1996, at A3.
62 See Darnton, supra note 58, at A8.
63 See Darnton, supra note 61, at A3.
64 See John Darnton, Europe Orders Ban on Exports of British Beef, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1996, at A1.
65 See Sarah Lyall, Britain Begins Killing Cows but Slow Pace Irks Farmers, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1996, | 1, at 5.
66 See Warren Hoge, British Call Halt to Cow Slaughter Demanded by European Union, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1996, at
8researchers published new ndings suggesting that nv-CJD was closer in molecular structure to BSE than to
the old strain of CJD, thus providing more evidence of a link between BSE and nv-CJD.67 Perhaps because
of this discovery, and after renewed pressure from the European Commission, the government again changed
its mind in December, reinstating the full planned slaughter of 1.3 million head.68
Ironically, despite the public hysteria since March, the growth in the number of new cases of nv-CJD has
actually slowed somewhat in recent months: only ve new cases have been reported in Britain since March,
bringing the overall total to fteen.69 In addition, French doctors have diagnosed at least one case, and
possibly a second, of the new strain.70 No cases have been conrmed anywhere else in the world.71
II. The American response
Initially, the Department of Agriculture (USDA), rather than the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
took the lead in coordinating the American response to the BSE scare. The earliest ocial action regarding
BSE came in July 1989, when the USDA, following their counterparts in several other countries, imposed a
ban on the importation of live ruminants and ruminant products from Britain.72 Although consistent with
the actions of other countries, this ban had little practical eect: perhaps due to its comparative self-reliance
in beef production, the United States had imported only 499 head of cattle from Britain in the years leading
up to the ban.73 Worryingly in retrospect, however, there appears to have been some confusion about the
A11.
67 See John Collinge et al., Molecular Analysis of Prion Strain Variation and the Etiology of `New Variant' CJD, 383
Nature 685 (1996).
68 See Warren Hoge, Major, Feeling Political Heat, Plans to Step Up Slaughter of Cows, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1996, at
A15.
69 See Fifteenth Case of New Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Reported By British Health Ocials, Food Chemical
News, Jan. 13, 1997, at 23.
70 See J.P. Deslys et al., New Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in France, 349 The Lancet 30 (1997).
71 See France Reports Second Case of Illness Linked to Cows, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1996, at A13.
72 See FDA Report, supra note 1, at 563.
73 See Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. Ocials Condent That Mad Cow Disease of Britain Has Not Occurred Here, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 27, 1996, at A12.
9scope of the ban. In 1990, a spokeswoman for the USDA told the New York Times that, although the United
States had banned the import of live cattle, it still imported small amounts of canned beef from Britain |
which conceivably could have been contaminated with BSE.74 However, on the heels of the British panic in
1996, the USDA said that no processed beef or live cattle had been imported from Britain since 1989 |
a rather broader claim.75 In any event, in the absence of more sweeping government action, the American
beef industry took matters into its own hands: the National Renderers Association and the Animal Protein
Producers Industry imposed a voluntary industrywide ban on the use of adult sheep oal in feed for ruminant
(cud-chewing) animals.76 However, data collected a few years later by the FDA suggests that this ban was
widely disregarded.77
Between 1989 and 1992, the USDA continued to serve as the primary American agency investigating BSE. In
1990, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), an arm of the USDA, established the BSE
Issues Management Team to analyze the risk of a BSE outbreak in the United States.78 In addition, APHIS
itself assumed several responsibilities in the battle against BSE, including examining the brains of dead
cattle for signs of the disease: as of earlier this month, more than 5,000 brains had been examined, with no
sign of BSE in any of them.79 In 1991, APHIS issued a report analyzing the risks of TSE transmission from
scrapie-infected sheep.80 Acting upon the report, APHIS subsequently imposed a ban on the importation of
products made from certain types of ruminant tissue, including meat meal, bone meal, blood meal, oal, fat,
and glands.81 APHIS also continued to control ocks of sheep for scrapie, as it had done since 1952,82 and
74 See McGowan, supra note 20, at C13.
75 See John Darnton, Britain Ties Deadly Brain Disease to Cow Ailment, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1996, at A1.
76 See Letter from F.D. Bisplingho, National Renderers Association, to Animal Protein Producers (1989).
77 See Food and Drug Administration, Report of Findings of Directed Inspections of Sheep Rendering Facilities (1993).
78 See FDA Report, supra note 1, at 562.
79 See id. at 563.
80 See Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States (1991).
81 See Importation of Animal Products and Byproducts From Countries Where BSE Exists, 56 Fed. Reg. 63865 (1991)
(to be codied at 9 C.F.R. pts. 94{95).
82 See FDA Report, supra note 1, at 563.
10issued updated reports on the risk of a BSE outbreak in the United States.83 Meanwhile, in 1990, the Oce
Internationale Epizootics (OIE) became the rst international health organization to take action, holding
meetings to consider ways of stemming the spread of BSE.84 The OIE would continue to hold meetings up
to, and after, the British scare of 1996.85
The FDA rst became involved in the regulation of BSE in 1992. On December 9, Dr. Fred Shank, Director
of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, wrote a letter to manufacturers of dietary supplements
after the FDA discovered that certain supplements contained brain, glands, and nervous tissue from cattle
and sheep.86 In the letter, Shank advised that manufacturers pursue a two-prong strategy to eliminate
potential BSE in their products, investigating the sources of any beef or sheep tissues to see if they were
produced in countries with TSE outbreaks and reformulating products with TSE-free tissues.87 In the letter,
however, Shank took pains to emphasize that there was {no proven link" between animal and human TSEs,88
and acknowledged that securing assurances that animal tissues were TSE-free would be {dicult."89 In 1993,
Dr. Jane Henney, FDA Deputy Commissioner for Operations, wrote a similar letter to manufacturers of
drugs, biological drugs, medical devices, and biological device products.90 Henney went one step further
than Shank in his corresponding letter of a year earlier, recommending that manufacturers not only identify
the sources of any bovine tissues used in their products, but also maintain traceable records for each lot of
such materials, documenting the country of origin of any live animal used to produce them.91 Although the
letter carried no rulemaking force, the nal sentence warned that all records kept on the recommendation
83 See Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Implications for the United
States (1993).
84 See FDA Report, supra note 1, at 564.
85 See id.
86 See Letter from Fred Shank, Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, to Manufacturers of Dietary
Supplements (Nov. 9, 1992), reprinted in Bovine Derived-Materials; Agency Letters to Manufacturers of FDA-Regulated
Products, 59 Fed. Reg. 44591, 44591{92 (1994) [hereinafter Agency Letters].
87 See id. at 44592.
88 Id.
89 See id.
90 See Letter from Jane E. Henney, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Food and Drug Administration, to Manufac-
turers of FDA-Regulated Products (Dec. 17, 1993), reprinted in Agency Letters, supra note 86, at 44592{93.
91 See id.
11of the letter should be {available for FDA inspection."92 Finally, in 1994, Linda Suydam, Henney's interim
successor, wrote two more advisory letters, to manufacturers of FDA-regulated products for animals and
manufacturers of dietary supplements and cosmetics respectively.93 In the rst letter, Suydam essentially
extended Henney's recommendations for manufacturers of human drugs to manufacturers of animal feed and
drugs, advising them to maintain a paper trail for all materials of bovine origin.94 In the second letter,
Suydam applied almost the same rule to manufacturers of dietary supplements | thus greatly expanding
the recommendations of the 1992 Shank letter | and of cosmetics.95 However, for the rst time in an FDA
letter, Suydam attached a list of types of cattle tissue, classifying each type according to the suspected level
of infectivity.96 The clear implication was that manufacturers who used tissues from the lower {categories"
of infectivity were less likely to be hounded for failure to comply with the letter's recommendations.
In 1994, the FDA made its rst foray into rulemaking on BSE, publishing a set of proposed rules that would
have banned the use in ruminant feed of sheep and goat oal made from certain tissues.97 The FDA found
that such oal was no longer generally recognized as safe (GRAS) due to the link between scrapie and BSE,98
and therefore proposed to reclassify such oal as a food additive for the purpose of regulation under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.99 The rules would have applied only to sheep and goats over the age of
twelve months, because of the comparative scarcity of scrapie in younger animals.100 Overall, this proposal
seemed far from aggressive: after all, Britain had implemented a wholesale ban on the use of all cattle and
sheep remains in 1988 and had further banned the use of cattle oal in human food products in 1989, acting
92 Id. at 44593.
93 See Letter from Linda A. Suydam, Interim Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Food and Drug Administration, to
Manufacturers of FDA-Regulated Products for Animals (Aug. 17, 1994), reprinted in Agency Letters, supra note 86, at 44593;
Letter from Linda A. Suydam, Interim Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Food and Drug Administration, to Manufacturers
and Importers of Dietary Supplements and Cosmetics (Aug. 17, 1994), reprinted in Agency Letters, supra note 86, at 44593{94.
94 See Letter to Manufacturers of FDA-Regulated Products, supra note 93, at 44593.
95 See Letter to Manufacturers and Importers, supra note 93, at 44593{94.
96 See id. at 44594.
97 See Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Specied Oal From Adult Sheep and Goats Prohibited
In Ruminant Feed, 59 Fed. Reg. 44584 (1994) (to be codied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 589) (proposed Aug. 29, 1994).
98 See id. at 44587.
99 See id.
100 See id. at 44588.
12on much less scientic evidence on the links between various types of TSEs.101 Despite the relative modesty
of the FDA's proposed rules, however, they never went into force. Why not? At least three explanations
obtain. First, the proposal was immediately opposed by large segments of the agricultural industry, which
were presumably concerned about the cost of purchasing or producing other types of oal.102 Second, FDA
risk-assessment studies | amazingly, with the benet of hindsight | suggested that the proposed rules
would have no real value in reducing the risk of a BSE outbreak in the United States.103 Third, the FDA
apparently was concerned about not having enough inspectors to enforce the proposed ban.104 Consequently,
although federal ocials during this period trumpeted the fact that no cases of BSE had yet been detected
in the United States,105 they omitted to mention that they had imposed far fewer safeguards than had their
British counterparts.
Despite the dearth of action by government agencies to prevent a BSE outbreak in the United States,
government ocials were quick to provide assurances in the wake of the British panic in March 1996. On
March 21, the day after the British announcement of a possible link between BSE and CJD, Agriculture
Secretary Dan Glickman and Dr. Will Hueston, the leading USDA expert on BSE, appeared on the Cable
News Network to play down the likelihood of an American BSE outbreak.106 Hueston said that the United
States had pursued a {very proactive program of surveillance" against BSE and had already acted to minimize
the risk of BSE being introduced into the country.107 For his part, Glickman said, {We are on top of it and
we're doing our best to insure that this does not spread anywhere in the world."108 In retrospect, these
assurances seem at best overcondent. For one thing, the United States had taken absolutely no action
to prevent the spread of BSE to other countries, as Glickman had claimed. In addition, the supposedly
101 See supra p. 4.
102 See Altman, supra note 73, at A12.
103 See id.
104 See Lawrence K. Altman, WHO Seeks Barriers Against Cow Disease, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1996, at A12.
105 See, e.g., Altman, supra note 73, at A12.
106 See EarlyPrime (Cable News Network television broadcast, Mar. 21, 1996).
107Id.
108Id.
13{proactive" American program of surveillance against BSE had consisted merely of keeping close tabs on
British cattle imports | and apparently not on imports of cattle from countries that had themselves had
BSE outbreaks as a result of British imports | and inspecting the carcasses of dead animals for signs of the
disease. However, due to the lengthy incubation period of BSE and the unavailability of any tests for BSE
while animals were still alive, such inspections would have been unable to detect an outbreak until it had
already reached epidemic proportions.
Although government ocials put on a brave face in public, they rushed into action behind the scenes.
On March 22, just a day after Glickman and Hueston went on television to reassure American consumers,
ocials from the USDA, FDA, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) met to discuss
the ramications of the British announcement.109 The meeting appears to have been the rst interagency
meeting involving both USDA and FDA ocials since the disease was originally diagnosed some ten years
earlier. However, the ocials took no immediate action, pending a meeting called by the World Health
Organization (WHO) for April 2 and 3. At that meeting, held in conjunction with the OIE, a group of
international experts recommended that all countries ban the use of ruminant tissues in ruminant feed to
prevent the further introduction of TSEs into cows.110 The experts also advised that milk and gelatin
were safe, due to the intransmissibility of BSE through either product.111 However, the experts made
no recommendations on the possible transmission of TSEs from cows to humans: in 1995, the WHO had
recommended a meeting in the fall of 1996 to discuss the possible link between BSE and CJD, but no date
was ever set.112
109 See id.
110 See FDA Report, supra note 1, at 564.
111 See id.
112 See Altman, supra note 73, at A12.
14Between the USDA-FDA meeting and the WHO conference, confusion reigned among the American gov-
ernment agencies, with action occurring on no fewer than three fronts. In late March, the USDA convened
a meeting of its own, involving seventy animal and public-health experts from the United States.113 In
stark contrast to the WHO conference, however, the USDA meeting, after reviewing current policies, did
not recommend any further safeguards, except that the number of post-mortem examinations of cattle for
BSE be increased.114 For its part, the FDA, acting independently from the USDA, announced on March 29
that it would expedite regulations barring all ruminant tissue from ruminant feed.115 The livestock industry
and veterinary groups immediately imposed a voluntary ban on such feed.116 Finally, state ocials began to
take action against the few remaining head of British cattle in the United States: by early April, twenty-one
states had destroyed, or begun negotiations to purchase and destroy, cattle imported from Britain before the
1989 ban, despite the fact that the none of the imported animals had shown any sign of BSE.117
On April 8, almost three weeks after the British parliamentary statement, American government ocials
held another interagency meeting | this time involving not just the FDA, USDA, and CDC, but also the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) and, curiously, the Department of Defense (DoD).118 The purpose of the
meeting was twofold: to disseminate information about the WHO meeting, and to coordinate preventative
activities on both the BSE and CJD fronts.119 However, the meeting was closed to the public, and the only
result of the meeting appears to have been a decision by the CDC to increase surveillance for CJD in four
target states: California, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Oregon.120 Federal ocials then took no further steps
for more than a month, until the FDA and APHIS convened a third interagency meeting, an international
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15symposium on the transmission of TSEs.121 At the symposium, ocials and experts discussed ndings from
unpublished and ongoing scientic investigations on TSEs, as well as possible approaches to managing the
risk of TSEs in animals.122
After nearly two months of relative government inactivity, the FDA took its rst ocial action in early May.
On May 10, Dr. Michael Friedman, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, announced in a statement to the
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations | apparently the rst testimony by
an FDA ocial before Congress on TSEs | that the FDA would shortly release an advanced notice of pro-
posed rulemaking (ANPRM) on the use of ruminant tissues in ruminant feed.123 On May 14, the ANPRM
was duly published in the Federal Register.124 In the brief four-page notice, the FDA requested submissions
on some eighteen specic topics, including scientic information on the occurrence of TSEs, data on the
amount of feed that may contain ruminant tissue, evidence of the potential economic consequences of regu-
latory action, estimates of the cost of compliance, and suggestions of possible alternative actions that could
be taken to combat the spread of TSEs.125 Although the ANPRM did not contain any concrete regulatory
proposals, the language of the notice clearly indicated that the FDA was contemplating an outright ban on
ruminant-to-ruminant feed.126
In the months following the ANPRM, government activity waned as BSE faded from the headlines. In
December, the FDA announced the formation of a TSE working group, comprising the Deputy Commis-
sioner for Operations and representatives from each of its ve centers.127 In addition, the interagency BSE
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16Policy Planning and Issue Management Group, formed in the wake of the April meeting between the FDA,
USDA, and other departments, announced plans to meet this month to nalize a new response plan to the
BSE scare.128 However, federal ocials took no further action until January 2, when the FDA proposed
comprehensive new rules to prevent the spread of TSEs.129
III. The FDA proposal
The FDA evidently timed the announcement of its proposal for maximum media eect, releasing it during
the traditionally slow news period between the holidays and the inauguration of a new Congress. On January
2, top ocials from the FDA and its responsible Cabinet department, the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), fanned out to promote the new plan. In a press release, HHS Secretary Donna Shalala said
of the proposal, {It will add another level of safeguards to protect the U.S. against the potential risk from
[TSEs]."130 For his part, outgoing FDA Commissioner David Kessler told the New York Times: {We are
creating a re wall, a barrier. If a case occurred in this country, the steps would conne the disease to the
individual animal and prevent secondary spread."131 He added in a HHS press release that the proposed
rules would {greatly decrease the potential risk to humans."132
The thirty-two-page proposal represents the United States government's most comprehensive published doc-
ument on TSEs, and thus merits close scrutiny. After a brief introduction, the report begins with a detailed
examination of the scientic and historical background to the crisis.133 In addition to scrapie in sheep and
BSE in cattle, the proposal examines the origins of TSEs in other animals, such as mink, deer, zoo animals,
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17and cats.134 Usefully, the report also includes a comprehensive history of human TSEs.135 While obviously
focusing on the old and new variants of CJD, the proposal also considers some more obscure forms of human
TSEs, including Gertsmann-Strausller-Scheinker Syndrome, a genetically transmitted but less progressive
strain of CJD, and Kuru, a bizarre variant of CJD that seems to have occurred only in members of a remote
cannibalistic tribe in Papua New Guinea.136 The proposal then examines the etiology of TSEs, concluding
that the disease probably crossed the species barrier via an infectious protein, or {prion."137 The FDA
notes that TSEs are most likely transmitted orally, although genetic factors may also play a role, to judge
from specic mutations commonly found in CJD suerers.138 Finally, the report cites studies showing that
it is dicult to render TSEs non-infectious: ominously, TSEs appear to be unresponsive to radiation or
ultraviolet light, although preliminary results indicate that ordinary processing of tissues containing TSEs
may have some eect.139
Next, the proposal examines the relationship between the various types of TSEs.140 The FDA cites British
studies to support the generally accepted theory, as discussed above,141 that BSE arose when cattle were
given feed containing sheep tissue contaminated with scrapie.142 Curiously, however, according to the FDA,
similar studies in the United States were unable to conrm this eect, raising the possibility that BSE may
have developed spontaneously.143 Having considered the likely relationship between scrapie and BSE, the
report then examines the possible link between BSE and CJD.144 The proposal traces the scientic genesis
of the theory, from the British announcement to the latest research demonstrating the close similarities in
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18structure between BSE and nv-CJD.145 Finally, the proposal notes that certain tissues from sheep and cattle
| namely, brain, spinal cord, and retina | appear to be more highly infective than others, with no evidence
that muscle meat, milk, or blood can transmit TSEs at all.146
Next, the proposal examines the potential risk of a BSE outbreak in the United States.147 Citing the {
devastating eect" an epidemic would have on animal health and the American farm industry, the FDA
argues that a {conservative regulatory approach" is justied.148 However, the FDA takes pains to note
that no cases of BSE or nv-CJD have yet been detected in the United States.149 In addition, the proposal
maintains that certain conditions that may have contributed to the BSE epidemic in Britain are not present
in the United States: namely, a higher rate of incidence of scrapie, less sophisticated feed processing, and
greater use of meat and bone meal in feed for young cattle.150 This section of the proposal ends with a
rather self-congratulatory history of the American regulatory response to the BSE scare: the FDA lauds the
USDA for its {proactive and preventive" actions to keep BSE out of the country and omits any reference to
the fact that its 1994 proposal was withdrawn in the face of heavy criticism.151
In the second major section of the report, the FDA briey surveys the statutory authority for its proposed
ban on ruminant-to-ruminant feed.152 First, it notes that the term {food," as dened in section 201(f) of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, has traditionally been read to include animal feed.153 Consequently, under
the same analysis used for human food products, the FDA argues that any material intended for use that
{results or may reasonably be expected to result in its becoming a component of food" constitutes a food
additive unless it is either GRAS or the subject of a prior sanction.154 According to the FDA, this doctrine
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19provides a mechanism for regulating the introduction of animal tissues into animal feed: in the absence of
a prior sanction, by declaring that those tissues are not longer GRAS, the FDA can regulate them like any
other kind of food additive and even, as proposed in this report, ban them altogether.155
Having dispensed rather summarily with the potential statutory diculties, the report next presents a
selection from the nearly 600 comments made in response to the FDA's ANPRM, issued some eight months
earlier.156 The respondents fell into two distinct | and predictable | groups. On the one hand, consumer
groups, pharmaceutical rms, scientists, and veterinarians all favored the proposed regulatory action, citing
the prophylactic eect on human health, the British experience, and the potential harm to the United
States economy from a BSE scare.157 Other supporters of the proposal cited the need to maintain consumer
condence in the beef and dairy industry, even if the risk of an actual outbreak in the United States was
comparatively small.158 On the other hand, renderers, meatpackers, feed companies, and farmers opposed
the proposed action.159 They cited the apparent absence of BSE in the United States, the lack of scientic
data to support a ban, environmental concerns, potential problems with enforcement, and the likely economic
hardship that would be suered by both producers and consumers of ruminant-based feed products.160 In
addition, they argued that, if the FDA were to impose a ban at all, it should prohibit only the use of those
tissues that have been demonstrated to be infective, rather than the use of all ruminant tissues.161
In the next major section of the report, the FDA outlines several alternative approaches to the proposed
ruminant-to-ruminant ban.162 As suggested by opponents to the proposal, the FDA could impose only a
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20partial ruminant-to-ruminant ban, essentially prohibiting just the use of the brain, eyes, spinal cord, and
distal ileum in animal feed.163 This proposal would have the advantage of comporting with the latest scien-
tic data, since there appears to be no evidence that other ruminant tissues can transmit TSEs; however, it
would also have the disadvantage of being exceedingly dicult to enforce, since there is currently no way to
identify with any certainty what types of tissue are contained in a given sample of feed.164 Second, the FDA
could apply a broader ban on all mammal-to-ruminant feed.165 As I shall suggest later in this paper, this
proposal would have advantages in ensuring greater protection and enhancing enforceability; however, the
likelihood of TSE transmission from non-ruminant mammals is, at least at present, comparatively small.166
Third, the FDA could bar the use in feed of tissues from only those species of mammals in which an American
outbreak of TSE has been conclusively established.167 This proposal, essentially a variant on the partial
ruminant-to-ruminant ban advocated by the industry, would eliminate the use of parts of sheep, goats, mink,
deer, and elk, but not cattle; the principal drawback is that, were BSE to be proven to occur spontaneously
(that is, via mutation), parts of BSE-infected cattle could make their way into animal feed unimpeded, thus
triggering an epidemic.168 Fourth, the FDA could bar only sheep and goat oal from ruminant feed.169 This
proposal would be arguably the easiest to enforce, but would suer the same drawback as the prior proposal:
namely, it would not guard against the entry of spontaneous BSE into the food chain.170 Finally, the FDA
could simply take no action.171 Of course, this would be the cheapest option to implement, but would oer
no additional protection against a BSE outbreak.172
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21Next, the report lays out the FDA's proposed rule for a complete ruminant-to-ruminant ban.173 Subsection
(a) of the rule essentially excludes blood, milk, and gelatin from the ruminant proteins covered by the ban,
since those substances have been proven to be unable to transmit TSEs.174 Subsection (a) also denes the
scope of the regulation: all renderers, protein blenders, feed manufacturers, and distributors are subject to
the rule.175 Subsection (b) declares, as suggested in the statutory-authority section of the proposal,176 that
protein derived from ruminant tissues is not GRAS when intended for use in animal feed.177 In subsection (c),
the FDA creates requirements for those renderers who are unable to separate ruminant from non-ruminant
materials.178 These renderers must place warning labels on their products, indicating the possibility that the
products may contain ruminant tissues.179 In addition, they must maintain copies of the sales invoices for
all of their products, to ensure that purchasers of those products are not using them to make animal feed.180
The subsection also provides incentives for renderers to develop either a method of deactivating TSEs or a
test to detect their presence.181 Subsection (d) establishes regulatory requirements for protein blenders, feed
manufacturers, and distributors who, like the renderers in subsection (c), are unable to separate ruminant
from non-ruminant materials.182 These parties are subject to the same requirements as the renderers in
subsection (c), except that parties able to purchase {clean" feed from renderers who have developed tests for
deactivation or detection are exempt from the requirements.183 Subsection (e) sets standards for renderers,
blenders, manufacturers, and distributors who can separate ruminant from non-ruminant materials.184 These
parties are subject to the same requirements as under subsections (c) and (d), but can obtain an exemption
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22for their non-ruminant products if they can certify that there was no blending of ruminant and non-ruminant
materials during processing.185 Subsection (f) establishes rules for feed users, requiring them only to make
available to FDA inspectors copies of the relevant invoices and labels.186 Subsection (g) establishes that
feed in violation of the previous provisions of the rule is deemed to be either adulterated or mislabeled for
purposes of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.187 Finally, subsection (h) requires that records be kept for
at least two years before being discarded.188
In a brief section, the proposal then considers the possible environmental consequences of the various al-
ternatives.189 The report notes that, were there to be no outbreak of BSE in the United States, the {no
action" alternative would, not surprisingly, have the fewest environmental ramications.190 According to the
FDA assessment, the proposed ruminant-to-ruminant ban would have moderate environmental eects, due
to the increased use of landlls for now-unused ruminant materials.191 However, the FDA argues that these
eects would be merely temporary, since the cattle markets would quickly adjust to the increased demand for
non-ruminant materials, thus leading to a decrease in the production of ruminants for use in animal feed.192
The report then considers the possible environmental ramications were there to be a BSE outbreak.193 The
report reasons that the {no action" alternative would have severe environmental consequences, since large
numbers of cattle would need to be destroyed and disposed of.194 However, under the FDA's somewhat cir-
cular reasoning, the ruminant-to-ruminant ban would have minimal environmental eects, since the spread
of BSE would be tightly controlled.195
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23In the nal major section of the proposal, the FDA analyzes the potential economic impact of the proered
alternatives.196 The FDA engages in standard cost-benet analysis to gauge the merits of the various op-
tions, reasoning that the benets of the proposed ruminant-to-ruminant rule would include the reduced need
to destroy an estimated 300,000 head of cattle in the event of an outbreak, reduced risk to public health,
reduced direct livestock losses, reduced costs of future regulation, and reduced losses in domestic sales and
exports due to a drop in consumer condence.197 Overall, although the FDA does not give a precise gure,
it estimates that these losses would total in the billions of dollars, with the destruction of BSE-exposed live-
stock costing some $3.7 billion alone.198 However, for the purpose of cost-benet analysis, any such gure
must obviously be discounted by the probability of an outbreak, which the FDA does not estimate | pre-
sumably for fear that disclosing any such number would spark negative public reaction. On the cost side, the
FDA calculates the total cost of the proposed rule to renderers, distributors, and users.199 In its somewhat
complicated analysis, the FDA breaks down costs into seven categories: capital costs, operating and disposal
costs, transportation, documentation, substitution costs, losses in revenue to renderers, and gains in revenue
to producers of non-ruminants.200 Under the FDA's worst-case market-impact scenario, the mammal-to-
ruminant ban would be the most expensive ($56.5 million), followed by the proposed ruminant-to-ruminant
ban ($48.3 million), the partial ruminant-to-ruminant ban ($27.4 million), the TSE-carrier-to-ruminant ban
($9.3 million), and the sheep-and-goat-to-ruminant ban ($300,000).201 Perhaps more interesting are the
FDA's gures on the potential losses to the rendering industry, which range from $305.6 million for the
mammal-to-ruminant ban to just $100,000 for the sheep-and-goat-to-ruminant ban.202 However, the FDA's
analysis is again incomplete, since it omits any reference to the increased enforcement costs that the FDA,
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24and presumably state agencies, would bear as a result of any of these bans. The proposal concludes with a
comprehensive list of references to government documents and scientic articles on TSEs.203
IV. Analysis of the FDA proposal
The FDA's ruminant-to-ruminant ban represents the most sweeping action yet proposed by a government
agency to deal with the threat of a BSE outbreak in the United States. However, I believe that it does not
go far enough. In this section, I shall outline two potential objections to the proposal and suggest alternative
approaches that would provide signicantly greater protection to the American people with only minimal,
if any, additional cost.
The rst objection that can be levied against the FDA proposal is that it is underprotective. Although the
most threatening form of TSE at the moment is undoubtedly BSE, TSEs have been found in non-ruminant
mammals, such as minks, as well as in ruminants.204 While the FDA proposal is not explicit on this point, it
implies that there would be no risk of infection under a ruminant-to-ruminant ban because mink tissue is not
used in animal feed.205 However, this reasoning is at best shortsighted. In recent years, TSEs have shown a
remarkable, and disturbing, ability to cross species lines: the rst case of bovine TSE was diagnosed just over
ten years ago, the rst case of feline TSE only seven years ago, and the rst case of the new strain of human
TSE less than two years ago.206 Given that some non-ruminant species would still be used in animal feed
under a ruminant-to-ruminant ban | indeed, undoubtedly in larger quantities, as producers switch from
ruminant to non-ruminant tissues to maintain protein levels in feed | the possibility of TSEs appearing in
those species, and then entering the food chain, presents a real threat. Under a mammal-to-ruminant ban
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25| one of the alternatives considered and then discarded by the FDA | such a possibility would evaporate.
In view of the FDA's stated desire to pursue a {conservative regulatory approach" due to the uncertainty
surrounding the risk of a BSE outbreak,207 the broader mammal-to-ruminant ban makes all the more sense.
In addition to the very real advantage of preventing the entry of as-yet-undiscovered varieties of TSEs into
the food chain, a mammal-to-ruminant ban may actually be cheaper to implement than the FDA's proposed
ruminant-to-ruminant ban. The FDA rightly suggests that renderers would suer somewhat larger losses as
a result of a mammal-to-ruminant ban.208 However, these losses may well be oset by other gains. First, a
mammal-to-ruminant ban would be easier to enforce. At present, as the FDA acknowledges, there is no way
of determining whether feed contains ruminant or non-ruminant materials.209 However, tests do exist to
establish whether feed contains mammalian or non-mammalian proteins.210 Second, a mammal-to-ruminant
ban, unlike a ruminant-to-ruminant one, would require no change to the current labeling system, which uses
denitions devised by the Association of American Feed Control Ocials.211 Third, a mammal-to-ruminant
ban would eliminate the risk that feed intended for ruminants would be accidentally mixed with feed meant
for non-ruminants, which could still contain potentially contaminated ruminant tissue.212 Indeed, just such
a risk of contamination largely motivated Britain's decision to apply a similar mammal-to-ruminant ban in
the wake of last year's public panic.213 Fourth, a mammal-to-ruminant ban would be easier for the industry
to implement. At least three industry groups pointed out that the segregation of ruminant and non-ruminant
tissues, as required by the FDA proposal, would be impractical due to the regular commingling of protein
products from the two categories.214 Fifth and nally, a mammal-to-ruminant ban would introduce less
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26instability in the commodity markets for animal protein, which are apparently very volatile.215
The FDA proposal is also underprotective because it fails to provide adequately for the development of
better diagnostics to detect TSEs. At present, the only way to conrm the presence of BSE is by autopsy,
with the result that it is dicult to isolate cases of BSE with any certainty.216 The same is true for the new
strain of CJD, although British researchers announced earlier this month that they have begun to develop
a simple diagnostic test that could be used on suspected nv-CJD victims while still alive.217 To be sure,
the current FDA proposal aims to encourage the development of such diagnostics, but only indirectly: as
noted above, the proposal would allow any rm that can develop and implement a demonstrably successful
diagnostic test to be exempt from the requirements of the new regulation.218 However, this provision would
have only comparatively small incentive eects, since the benet of exemption would be little more than
the foregone cost of increased recordkeeping. Instead, the FDA, perhaps in conjunction with the USDA and
Congress, should directly fund research aimed at developing better diagnostics. To oset the cost of such
funding, Congress could pass a {BSE tax" on animal feed, with feed producers simply passing the cost of
the tax on to consumers.
The second objection that can be raised against the FDA proposal is that it would be very hard, and perhaps
impossible, to enforce. The proposal itself acknowledges this diculty, stating with typical governmental
euphemism, and not a little understatement, that the regulation of BSE {presents unique enforcement
challenges."219 In the absence of a test to determine whether feed contains ruminant or non-ruminant
materials, as discussed above,220 the FDA proposes to {rely on normal business records" as a means of
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27checking compliance with the new rules.221 However, this seems at best nave. It would be child's play for a
feed manufacturer, faced with the substantially higher cost of procuring non-ruminant instead of ruminant
ingredients, to cut a deal with a ruminant-tissue producer, faced with a major loss of business as a result of
the new rule. Indeed, it would make good economic sense for these parties to bargain in this fashion, since
each would be better o under standard Coasian analysis. All that the parties would need to do is to forge
the paperwork | which would be all the easier if the producer of the ruminant tissue being covertly sold
has an overt non-ruminant-tissue operation as well.
Two other enforcement-related diculties merit brief consideration. First, it is often dicult for renderers,
from whom feed manufacturers obtain a substantial share of their ingredients, to separate ruminant from
non-ruminant tissue. Independent renderers, in particular, use as raw materials everything from restaurant
scraps to byproducts from multispecies slaughtering operations.222 For these producers, separating ruminant
from non-ruminant tissue, if not entirely impossible, may simply be economically unfeasible. Therefore, the
eect of the proposed rules may be to drive these producers out of business altogether, thus pushing up the
cost of non-ruminant tissue ingredients still further. Second, the FDA would almost certainly have to hire
more inspectors to deal with the added burden of enforcing the new rule. To monitor compliance, inspectors
will have to follow a paper trail from feed purchasers to the original farmers whose animals supplied the
tissue used in the feed, which could take days or even weeks per case. In the absence of specic provisions
to increase the number of inspectors, it is unclear how rigorously the new proposal will be enforced, thus
undermining its potential deterrent eect.
Rather than attempting to enforce the proposed rule by checking paperwork, the FDA should establish
criminal sanctions for any violation. Such sanctions could apply not just to renderers and feed manufacturers,
but also to any farmer who uses feed containing ruminant tissue, whether knowingly or not. To be sure,
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28there are at least three potential objections to such a proposal. First, given the fact that farmers using
feed are analogous to consumers who are not generally subject to FDA sanctions, it could be argued that
the mere use of a product does not constitute transmission in interstate commerce sucient to invoke the
FDA's statutory authority,223 though arguably the FDA could regulate animals to which ruminant feed is
administered on the ground they are about to be introduced in interstate commerce.224 Second, it could be
argued that the FDA does not have the authority to impose criminal sanctions in this context, though its
right to do so in the context of directors of corporations has generally been upheld.225 Third, it could be
argued that, even if the FDA does have the power to impose criminal sanctions, farmers should be protected
by some form of scienter requirement, though such a requirement has frequently not been imposed.226 In
any event, a powerful argument can be made in rebuttal to all three of these points. Even if the FDA
does not have the statutory authority to impose such wide-ranging sanctions, Congress could pass a statute
embodying both the FDA's proposed rule and tighter, criminal sanctions. Given the widespread public
concern over BSE, such legislation might have a good chance at passage, despite the potential opposition of
industry lobby groups.227 No matter how such sanctions are imposed, though, they would have a benecial
eect by placing the burden on the industry | rather than FDA inspectors | to ensure that feed products
are safe. If farmers know they could be sent to jail for using feed containing ruminant products, they will
take pains to extract guarantees from their suppliers that the feed they are purchasing is ruminant-free, and
so on down the line. Such a rule would allow the FDA to save substantially on enforcement costs while
simultaneously enhancing the proposed rule's deterrent eects.
223 See 21 U.S.C. | 334(a) (1994).
224 See United States v. Seven Barrels, Etc., of Spray Dried Whole Egg, 141 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1944).
225 See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
226 See Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials (2d ed. 1991)
1163{64.
227 See FDA Plans Public Hearings on Feed Ban Proposal; Critics Question Scope, Cost of Proposed Rule, Food Chemical
News, Jan. 13, 1997, at 3.
29Conclusion
Overall, the BSE scare presents the perfect example of how not to manage a public-health crisis. On both
sides of the Atlantic, governments reacted slowly and clumsily to increasingly disturbing scientic evidence,
thus engendering public panic with its concomitant eects on consumer condence. In the United States,
in particular, government agencies were far too complacent in the face of unknown but potentially massive
health risks. The FDA's recent proposal represents an admirable rst step toward implementing adequate
protections against the dangers of both presently known and as-yet-undiscovered forms of TSEs. However,
they do not go far enough. The FDA should reissue the proposal with a broader scope, increased funding for
diagnostics, and stier penalties for violation. Only then will we truly have learned our lessons from BSE.
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